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 1 Introduction
The standard real business cycle (RBC) model of Kydland and Prescott (1982) claims that
exogenous aggregate technology shocks drive economic ￿ uctuation.1 But these shocks need
to be large and persistent in order to match various stylized facts.2 Indeed, Cochrane (1994)
shows that there are other possible candidates of shocks, and illustrates the di¢ culty in
identifying and attributing a particular shock that could explain the observed business cycles.
In recent years a number of theoretical models that highlights the role of ￿nancial accel-
erator in propagating and amplifying macroeconomic shocks has further casted doubts on
aggregate techonology shocks in the standard RBC model as the driving force in business ac-
tivities.3 This literature addresses the question ￿ can credit constraints and (or) asymmetric
information between borrows and lenders propagate and amplify business cycles?￿Although
the theoretical contributions have improved our understanding of the propagation mechnism,
the lack of empirical support has led many to question the relevance of ￿nancial accelerator
type models.4
In this paper, we continue with this empirical debate by posing a question ￿ How do dif-
ferences in the credit channel a⁄ect investment behavior in the U.S. and the Euro area?￿To
1 King and Rebelo (2000) surveys a recent development in real business cycle literature and presents further
support of this claim.
2 For example, Cogley and Nason (1995) show that standard RBC models cannot deliever a hump-shaped
response of output to a transient shock that is consistent with U.S. time series.
3 Financial accelerator models are usually clasi￿ed into two catergories: agency costs models and credit
constraint models. Some prominent contributions in agency costs literature are: Williamson (1987), Bernanke
and Gertler (1989, 1990), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). For
constraint models, see Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kiyotaki (1998), Cooley
and Quadrini (2001), and Kocherlakota (2000). Walsh (2003) presents an overview, both theoretical and
empirical, of the literature.
4 See, for example, Fisher (1999), Kocherlakota (2000), Cole and Ohanian (2000), Cooper and Ejarque
(2000), Arias (2002), and Cordoba and Ripoll (2003) for a negative stance on the role that ￿nancial sector
plays in the actual economy. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer (2003) are the
only few that document the empirical relevance for ￿nancial acceleration.
1Table 1: Financial Sector Information on Euro Area Countries and U.S
Country Bankruptcy Rate Risk Premium
Austria (German Civil Law) 0.332 3.76
Ireland (English Common Law) 0.685 8.85
Spain (Frech Civil Law) 0.0005 1.99
U.S. (English Common Law) 0.974 1.87
Source: See Data Appendix. The bankruptcy rates for the E.U. countries are calculated as an
average percentage of bankruptcies to number of ￿rms for the period between 1990 - 1999. Risk
Premia are the di⁄erences between lending and deposit rates. For the U.S. numbers, see Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997).
analyze this question, we calibrate a version of the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) agency cost
model of business cycles for these two economies. Agresti and Mojon (2001) and Cecchetti
(1999) show that these two monetary unions exhibit similar business cycle patterns but quite
di⁄erent in ￿nancial structures. For expositional purpose, Figure 1 shows the autocorrela-
tion functions (ACF) for output growth for the U.S. and some of the Euro Area countries
(including the aggregate EMU11). These ACFs clearly show that the business cycle patters
between the two monetary unions are similar.
We focus on two key components of the lending channel, the default premium associated
with bank loans and bankruptcy rates, in order to identify the di⁄erences in the U.S. and
European ￿nancial sectors. More speci￿cally, for the Euro Area countries, we focus on
Austria, Ireland and Spain. These three countries represent three di⁄erent legal system
and are known to have either low bankruptcy rate (e.g. Spain) or high risk premium (e.g.
Ireland): see Table 1.5
Our results indicate that the di⁄erences in ￿nancial structures quantitatively a⁄ect the
5 We also include Austria as a case where both the bankruptcy rate and risk premium lie between the two
extremes of Ireland and Spain.
2cyclial behavior in the two areas: the magnitude of the credit channel e⁄ects is ampli￿ed by
the di⁄erences in the ￿nancial structures. We further demonstrate that the e⁄ects of minor
di⁄erences in the credit market translate into large, persistent and asymmetric ￿ uctuations
in price of capital, bankruptcy rate and risk premium. The e⁄ects imply that the Euro Area￿ s
supply elasticities for capital are less elastic than the U.S. We conclude that the ￿nancial
accelerator mechanism could potentially play a signi￿cant role in business cycles in the Euro
area.
The next section presents the model while the following section discusses equilibrium
characteristics. The ￿nal section o⁄ers some concluding comments. The derivation for the
steady state analysis is given in the appedix. And the data appendix is listed separately at
the end.
2 Model
We employ the agency cost business cycle model of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) to address
the ￿nancial intermediaries￿role in the propagation of productivity shocks across di⁄erent
monetary unions. Since, for the most part, the model is identical to that in Carlstrom and
Fuerst, the exposition of the model will be brief.
The model is a variant of a standard RBC model in which an additional production sector
is added. This sector produces capital using a technology which transforms investment into
capital. In a standard RBC framework, this conversion is always one-to-one; in the Carlstrom
and Fuerst framework, the production technology is subject to technology shocks. (The
aggregate production technology is also subject to technology shocks as is standard.) This
3capital production sector is owned by entrepreneurs who ￿nance their production via loans
from a risk neutral ￿nancial intermediation sector - this lending channel is characterized
by a loan contract with a ￿xed interest rate. (Both capital production and the loans are
intra-period.) If a capital producing ￿rm realizes a low technology shock, it will declare
bankruptcy and the ￿nancial intermediary will take over production; this activity is subject
to monitoring costs. With this brief description, we now turn to an explicit characterization
of the economy.
2.1 Households
The representative household is in￿nitely lived and has expected utility over consumption ct
and leisure 1 ￿ lt with functional form given by:
E0
1 P
t=0
￿t [ln(ct) + ￿ (1 ￿ lt)] (1)
where E0 denotes the conditional expectation operator on time zero information, ￿ 2 (0;1);
￿ > 0; and lt is time t labor. The household supplies labor, lt; and rents its accumulated
capital stock, kt; to ￿rms at the market clearing real wage, wt; and rental rate rt; respectively,
thus earning a total income of wtlt + rtkt: The household then purchases consumption good
from ￿rms at price of one (i.e. consumption is the numeraire), and purchases new capital,
it; at a price of qt: Consequently, the household￿ s budget constraint is
wtlt + rtkt ￿ ct + qtit (2)
4The law of motion for households￿capital stock is standard:
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + it (3)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the depreciation rate on capital.
The necessary conditions associated with the maximization problem include the standard
labor-leisure condition and the intertemporal e¢ ciency condition associated with investment.
Given the functional form for preferences, these are:
￿ct = wt (4)
qt
ct
= ￿Et
￿
qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿) + rt+1
ct+1
￿
(5)
2.2 Firms
The economy￿ s output of the consumption good is produced by ￿rms using Cobb-Douglas
technology6
Yt = ￿tK
￿K
t H
￿H
t (He
t )
￿He (6)
where Yt represents the aggregate output, ￿t denotes the aggregate technology shock, Kt
denotes the aggregate capital stock, Ht denotes the aggregate household labor supply, He
t
denotes the aggregate supply of entrepreneurial labor, and ￿K + ￿H + ￿He = 1:7
6 Note that we denote aggregate variables with upper case while lower case represents per-capita values.
Prices are also lower case.
7 As in Carlstrom and Fuerst, we assume that the entrepreneur￿ s labor share is small, in particular,
￿He = 0:0001. The inclusion of entrepreneurs￿labor into the aggregate production function serves as a
5The pro￿t maximizing representative ￿rm￿ s ￿rst order conditions are given by the fac-
tor market￿ s condition that wage and rental rates are equal to their respective marginal
productivities:
wt = ￿t￿H
Yt
Ht
(7)
rt = ￿t￿K
Yt
Kt
(8)
we
t = ￿t￿He
Yt
He
t
(9)
where we
t denotes the wage rate for entrepreneurial labor.
2.3 Entrepreneurs
A risk neutral representative entrepreneur￿ s course of action is as follows. To ￿nance his
project at period t, he borrows resources from the Capital Mutual Fund according to an
optimal ￿nancial contract. The entire borrowed resources, along with his total net worth at
period t, are then invested into his capital creation project. If the representative entrepreneur
is solvent after observing his own technology shock, he then makes his consumption decision;
otherwise, he declares bankruptcy and production is monitored (at a cost) by the Capital
Mutual Fund.
2.4 Optimal Financial Contract
The optimal ￿nancial contract between entrepreneur and the Capital Mutual Fund is de-
scribed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). But for expository purposes as well as to explain
technical device so that entrepreneurs￿net worth is always positive, even when insolvent.
6our approach in addressing the second moment e⁄ect on equilibrium conditions, we brie￿ y
outline the model.
The entrepreneur has access to a stochastic technology that transforms it units of con-
sumption into !tit units of capital. The investment technology shock !t is distributed as
i:i:d. with the lognormal distribution ￿ that has a mean of unity and a standard deviation
of ￿. The realization of !t is privately observed by entrepreneur ￿banks can observe the
realization at a cost of ￿it units of consumption.
The entrepreneur enters period t with one unit of labor endowment and zt units of capital.
Labor is supplied inelastically while capital is rented to ￿rms, hence income in the period is
wt + rtzt: This income along with remaining capital determines net worth (denominated in
units of consumption) at time t:
nt = wt + zt (rt + qt (1 ￿ ￿)) (10)
With a positive net worth, the entrepreneur borrows (it ￿ nt) consumption goods and
agrees to pay back
￿
1 + rk￿
(it ￿ nt) capital goods to the lender, where rk is the interest rate
on loans. Thus, the entrepreneur defaults on the loan if his realization of output is less then
the re-payment, i.e.
!t <
￿
1 + rk￿
(it ￿ nt)
it
￿ ￿ !t (11)
The optimal borrowing contract is given by the pair (i; ￿ !) that maximizes entrepreneur￿ s
return subject to the lender￿ s willingness to participate (all rents go to the entrepreneur).
Denoting the c:d:f: and p:d:f: of !t as ￿(!t) and ￿(!t) respectively, the contract is deter-
7mined by the solution to:8:
max
fi;￿ !g
qif (￿ !) subject to qig (￿ !) ￿ (i ￿ n)
where
f (￿ !) =
￿Z 1
￿ !
!￿(!)d! ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(￿ !)] ￿ !
￿
which can be interpreted as the fraction of the expected net capital output received by the
entrepreneur9,
g (￿ !) =
￿Z ￿ !
0
!￿(!)d! + [1 ￿ ￿(￿ !)] ￿ ! ￿ ￿(￿ !)￿
￿
which represents the lender￿ s fraction of expected capital output, ￿(￿ !) is the bankruptcy
rate so that ￿(￿ !)￿ denotes monitoring costs. Also note that f (￿ !)+g (￿ !) = 1￿￿(￿ !)￿ : the
RHS is the average amount of capital that is produced ￿this is split between entrepreneurs
and lenders. Hence the presence of monitoring costs reduces net capital production.10
8 This notation is imprecise in that it implies the distributions are time-invariant. That is, the c:d:f:
should be expressed as ￿t (!t) ￿ ￿(!t;!t￿1;￿t) with the p:d:f: expressed as ￿t (!t) ￿ ￿(!t;!t￿1;￿t). For
simplicity, we suppress the time-notation.
9 The deriviative of this function is f
0 (￿ !) = ￿(￿ !) ￿ 1. Thus, as ￿(￿ !) 2 [0;1], we have f
0 (￿ !) ￿ 0: That
is, as the lower bound for the realization of the technology shock (or the cuto⁄ bankruptcy rate) increases,
the entrepreneur￿ s output share goes down.
10 This suggests that monitoring costs are akin to investment adjustment costs - in fact, Carlstrom and
Fuerst demonstrate that this is the case. The important di⁄erence between this model and a model with
adjustment costs is that entrepreneurs￿net worth is an endogenous state variable that a⁄ects the dynamics
of the economy - this feature is not present in an adjustment cost model.
8The necessary conditions for the optimal contract problem are
@ (:)
@￿ !
: qif0 (￿ !) = ￿￿ig0 (￿ !)
) ￿ =
￿f
0
(￿ !)
g0 (￿ !)
￿ =
f0 (￿ !)
￿(￿ !)￿ + f0 (￿ !)
￿ =
1 ￿ ￿(￿ !)
1 ￿ ￿(￿ !) ￿ ￿(￿ !)￿
where ￿ is the shadow price of capital. This can be rewritten as:
1 ￿
1
￿
=
￿(￿ !)
1 ￿ ￿(￿ !)
￿ (12)
As shown by eq.(12), the shadow price of capital is an increasing function of the relevant
Inverse Mill￿ s ratio (interpreted as the conditional probability of bankruptcy) and the agency
costs. If the product of these terms equals zero, then the shadow price equals the cost of
capital production, i.e. ￿ = 1.
The second necessary condition is:
@ (:)
@i
: qf (￿ !) = ￿￿[1 ￿ qg (￿ !)]
9Solving for q using the ￿rst order conditions, we have
q =
￿
(f (￿ !) + g (￿ !)) +
￿(￿ !)￿f (￿ !)
f0 (￿ !)
￿￿1
(13)
=
￿
1 ￿ ￿(￿ !)￿ +
￿(￿ !)￿f (￿ !)
f0 (￿ !)
￿￿1
￿ [1 ￿ D(￿ !)]
￿1
where D(￿ !) can be thought of as the total default costs.
Equation (13) de￿nes an implicit function ￿ ! (q) that is increasing in q, or the price of
capital that incorporates the expected bankruptcy costs. The price of capital, q, di⁄ers
from unity due to the presence of the credit market friction. That is, to compensate for the
bankruptcy (monitoring) costs, there must be a premium on the price of capital. And this
premium is set by the amount of monitoring costs and the probability of bankruptcy. (Note
that f0 (￿ !) = ￿(￿ !) ￿ 1 < 0.)
Finally, the incentive compatibility constraint implies
i =
1
(1 ￿ qg (￿ !))
n (14)
Equation (14) implies that investment is linear in net worth and de￿nes a function that
represents the amount of consumption goods placed in to the capital technology: i(q;n).
The fact that the function is linear implies that the aggregate investment function is well
de￿ned.
102.5 Entrepreneur￿ s Consumption Choice
To rule out self-￿nancing by the entrepreneur (i.e. which would eliminate the presence of
agency costs), it is assumed that the entrepreneur discounts the future at a faster rate than
the household. This is represented by following expected utility function:
E0
1 P
t=0
(￿￿)
t ce
t (15)
where ce
t denotes entrepreneur￿ s consumption at date t; and ￿ 2 (0;1): This new parameter,
￿, will be chosen so that it o⁄sets the steady-state internal rate of return to entrepreneurs￿
investment.
At the end of the period, the entrepreneur ￿nances consumption out of the returns from
the investment project implying that the law of motion for the entrepreneur￿ s capital stock
is:
zt+1 = nt
￿
f (￿ !t)
1 ￿ qtg (￿ !t)
￿
￿
ce
t
qt
(16)
Note that the expected return to internal fund is
qtf(￿ !t)it
nt ; that is, the net worth of size nt
is leveraged into a project of size it, entrepreneurs keep the share of the capital produced and
capital is priced at qt consumption goods. Since these are intra-period loans, the opportunity
cost is 1.11
Consequently, the representative entrepreneur maximizes his expected utility function in
equation (15) over consumption and capital subject to the law of motion for capital, equation
(16), and the de￿nition of net worth given in equation (10). The resulting Euler equation is
11 As noted above, we require in steady-state 1 = ￿
qtf(￿ !t)
(1￿qtg(￿ !t)):
11as follows:
qt = ￿￿Et
￿
[qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿) + rt+1]
￿
qt+1f (￿ !t+1)
(1 ￿ qt+1g (￿ !t+1))
￿￿
2.6 Financial Intermediaries
The Capital Mutual Funds (CMFs) act as risk-neutral ￿nancial intermediaries who earn no
pro￿t and produce neither consumption nor capital goods. There is a clear role for the CMF
in this economy since, through pooling, all aggregate uncertainty of capital production can
be eliminated. The CMF receives capital from three sources: entrepreneurs sell undepre-
ciated capital in advance of the loan, after the loan, the CMF receives the newly created
capital through loan repayment and through monitoring of insolvent ￿rms, and, ￿nally, those
entrepreneur￿ s that are still solvent, sell some of their capital to the CMF to ￿nance current
period consumption. This capital is then sold at the price of qt units of consumption to
households for their investment plans.
2.7 Equilibrium
There are four markets: labor markets for households and entrepreneurs, goods markets for
consumption and capital.
Ht = (1 ￿ ￿)lt (17)
where ￿ denotes the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy.
He
t = ￿ (18)
12Ct + It = Yt (19)
where Ct = (1 ￿ ￿)ct + ￿ce
t and It = ￿it:
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + It [1 ￿ ￿(￿ !)￿] (20)
A competitive equilibrium is de￿ned by the decision rules for fKt+1;Zt+1;Ht;He
t ;qt;nt;it; ￿ !t;ct;ce
tg
where these decision rules are stationary functions of fKt;Zt;￿tg and satisfy the following
equations12
￿ct = ￿t￿H
Yt
Ht
(21)
qt
ct
= ￿Et
￿
1
ct+1
￿
qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿t+1￿K
Yt+1
Kt+1
￿￿
(22)
qt =
￿
1 ￿ ￿(￿ !t)￿ +
￿(￿ !)￿f (￿ !t)
f0 (￿ !t)
￿￿1
(23)
it =
1
(1 ￿ qtg (￿ !t))
nt (24)
qt = ￿￿Et
￿￿
qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿t+1￿K
Yt+1
Kt+1 t+1
￿￿
qt+1f (￿ !t+1)
(1 ￿ qt+1g (￿ !t+1))
￿￿
(25)
nt = ￿t￿He
Yt
He
t
+ zt
￿
qt (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿t￿K
Yt
Kt
￿
(26)
Zt+1 = ￿nt
￿
f (￿ !t)
1 ￿ qtg (￿ !t)
￿
￿ ￿
ce
t
qt
(27)
￿t+1 = ￿
￿
t￿t+1 where ￿t ￿ i:i:d: with E (￿t) = 1 (28)
12 A more thorough presentation of the equilibrium conditions are presented in the Appendix.
133 Equilibrium Characteristics
3.1 Steady-state analysis
While our focus is primarily on the cyclical behavior of the economy, we brie￿ y examine
the steady-state properties of the economies. For this analysis, we use, to a large extent,
the parameters employed in Carlstrom and Fuerst￿ s (1997) analysis for the U.S. and Casares
(2001) for the Euro Area countries.. Speci￿cally, the following parameter values are used:
Table 2: Parameter Values
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
U.S. 0.99 0.36 0.02 0.25 0.95
Euro Area 0.995 0.36 0.025 0.25 0.95
Agents discount factor, the depreciation rate and capital￿ s share are fairly standard in
RBC analysis. The remaining parameter, ￿, represents the monitoring costs associated with
bankruptcy. This value, as noted by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) is relatively prudent given
estimates of bankruptcy costs (which range from 20% (Altman (1984) to 36% (Alderson and
Betker (1995) of ￿rm assets).
The remaining parameters, (￿;￿), determine the steady-state bankruptcy rate (which
we denote as br and is expressed in percentage terms) and the risk premium (denoted rp)
associated with bank loans.13 (Also, recall that ￿ is calibrated so that the rate of return
to internal funds is equal to 1
￿.)14 While Carlstrom and Fuerst found it useful to use the
13 The equations de￿ning the steady-state are presented in the Appendix. This derivation also demonstrates
that the parameter ￿ (the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy) is strictly a normalization and does not
in￿ uence equilibrium characteristics.
14 The fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy, ￿, is not a critical parameter for the behavior of the
economy. As Carlstrom and Fuerst note, it is simply a normalization. Aggregate consumption in the model
14observed bankruptcy rate to determine ￿, for our analysis we treat ￿ and br as exogenous and
examine the steady state behavior of the economy under di⁄erent scenarios. In particular
we consider the following four economies as displayed in Table 3, where the values of ￿ are
reported strictly for comparison. That is, once the values of ￿ and br are speci￿ed, the value
of ￿ is determined endogenously. For these experiments, we varied ￿ and ￿ so that they
reamined consistent wtih a risk premium for each economy. The main message from Table 3
is that the combination of increase in the bankruptcy rate and the risk premium contributes
in increasing uncertainty (￿) and hence an increase in the cut-o⁄ points for the changes in
the distribution of the lending channel (￿ !): For example, the combination of low bankruptcy
rate but relatively high risk premium for Spain leads to high degrees of uncertainty, which
then leads to the highest lending cut-o⁄ point.
Table 3: Four Economies
Economy ￿ ! ￿ br (%) ￿
U.S.
(C&F)
-0.06 0.207 0.974 0.9474
Austria -2.35 0.761 0.33 0.9653
Ireland -2.46 0.852 0.685 0.9336
Spain -5.98 1.315 0.005 0.9844
3.2 Cyclical Behavior
As described in Section 2, eqs. (21) through (28) determine the equilibrium properties of the
economy. To analyze the cyclical properties of the economy, we linearize (i.e. take a ￿rst-
is indeed a weighted average of household and entrepreneurial consumption but the weights are determined
by the steady-state level of per-capita consumption for these groups. This is endogenously determined - but
not by ￿. This is demonstrated at the end of the Appendix.
15order Taylor series expansion) of these equations around the steady-state values and express
all terms as percentage deviations from steady-state values. This numerical approximation
method is standard in quantitative macroeconomics.
The behavior of these four economies is analyzed by examining the impulse response
functions of several key variables to a 1% innovation in ￿ with the pesistency of shock to be
0:95: These are presented in Figures 2-4. As in Carlstrom and Fuerst, the standard deviation
of the technology shock !t is, on average, equal to 0:207. That is, we set ￿ ￿! = 0:207.
We ￿rst turn to aggregate output and household consumption and investment. With
greater positive productivity shock, as expected, aggregate output, consumption and in-
vestment all increase. And the magnitude of increase across di⁄erent economies is almost
equivalent. These e⁄ects are shown in Figures 2 - 4. As in Carlstrom and Fuerst, a technol-
ogy shock increases output and the demand for capital. The resulting increase in the price of
capital implies greater lending activity and, hence, an increase in the bankruptcy rate (and
risk premia) as shown in Figures 5 - 7. Our focus, as was in Carlstrom and Fuerst, was on the
e⁄ects of innovation to the aggregate technology shock and, because of the assumed persis-
tence in this shock, is driven by the change in the ￿rst moment of the aggregate production
shock. What is di⁄erent in our results in compare to Carlstrom and Fuerst is the magnitude
of the impulse response functions for bankruptcy rate, risk premium and price of capital
across di⁄erent economies. As the cut-o⁄ point increases (!), the response of capital price
is increases (see Figure 7). This is a direct evidence that the Euro Area￿ s supply elasticities
for capital are less elastic than the U.S.
164 Conclusion
Theoretical works on the credit channel e⁄ect on aggregate economic varialbes in the last ten
years has seen a proliferation of macroeconomic models. The common element in this litera-
ture is that lending activity is characterized by asymmetric information between borrowers
and lenders. As a consequence, interest rates may not move to clear lending markets (as
in models with moral hazard and adverse selection elements) or ￿rms￿net worth may play
a critical role as collateral in in￿ uencing lending activity (as in models with agency costs).
While debate on the empirical support for these models continues, there is little doubt that,
as a whole, they have improved our understanding of ￿nancial intermediation and broadened
the scope of how monetary policy, through the impact of interest rates on ￿rms￿net worth,
can in￿ uence macroeconomic performance.
Our attempt in this paper is to show empirically that the credit channel e⁄ect matters
and that the e⁄ect propagates and ampli￿es business cycles. Our result is in direct contrast
to the recent ￿ndings by Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon and Terlizzese (2003) who state that the
interest rate channel alone could explain most of the monetary policies in the Euro Area.
Our and Angeloni and et al￿ s results di⁄er due mainly due to the nature of methodology:
we calibrate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium whereas Agenloni and et al estimate
reduced form equations.
Our primary ￿ndings fall into two broad categories. First, aggregate technology shock
could propagate and amplify various aggregate macroeconomic variables in an environment
where there is a ￿nancial intermediation. i.e. where there is a credit channel e⁄ect. Second,
when compare to various economies that di⁄er only in two ￿nancial dimention ( bankruptcy
17rate and risk premium), we ￿nd that the magnitude of shocks to aggregate technology may be
quantitatively large. We demonstrate that the e⁄ects of minor di⁄erences in the credit market
translate into large, persistent and asymmetric ￿ uctuations in price of capital, bankruptcy
rate and risk premium. The e⁄ects imply that the Euro Area￿ s supply elasticities for capital
are less elastic than the U.S. We conclude that the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism could
potentially play a signi￿cant role in business cycles in the Euro area. This result directly
lends one to conclude the following: the credit channel that a⁄ects the ￿nancial sector do
indeed matter for macroeconomic behavior.
With the central role that information plays in these models, they present a potentially
rich environment to study the e⁄ects that changes in uncertainty have on aggregate economic
behavior. For future research, together with the results in this paper , an analysis of the
e⁄ects that uncertainty has on aggregate economic performance across di⁄erent economies
would be fruitful. To do this, one could introduce time-varying uncertainty as in Dorofeenko,
Lee and Salyer (2003), i.e. second moment e⁄ects, into the agency cost model of Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997). Within this setting, we could model time varying uncertainty as a mean
preserving spread in the distribution of the technology shocks a⁄ecting capital production
and explore how changes in uncertainty a⁄ect equilibrium characteristics.
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205 Appendix:
5.1 Steady-state conditions in the Carlstrom and Fuerst Agency Cost
Model
We ￿rst present the equilibrium conditions and express these in scaled (by the fraction of
entrepreneurs in the economy) terms. Then the equations are analyzed for steady-state
implications. As in the text, upper case variables denote aggregate wide while lower case
represent household variables. Preferences and technology are:
U (~ c;1 ￿ l) = ln~ c + ￿ (1 ￿ l)
Y = ￿K￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)l]
1￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
Where ￿denotes the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy and ￿ is the aggregate
technology shock. Note that aggregate household labor is L = (1 ￿ ￿)lwhile entrepreneurs
inelastically supply one unit of labor. We assume that the share of entrepreneur￿ s labor is
approximately zero so that the production function is simply
Y = ￿K￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)l]
1￿￿
This assumption implies that entrepreneurs receive no wage income (see eq. (9) in C&F.
There are nine equilibrium conditions:
21The resource constraint
(1 ￿ ￿)~ ct + ￿ce
t + ￿it = Yt = ￿tK￿
t [(1 ￿ ￿)lt]
1￿￿ (29)
Let c =
(1￿￿)~ c
￿ , h =
(1￿￿)
￿ l, and kt = Kt
￿ then eq(29) can be written as:
ct + ce
t + it = ￿tk￿
t h1￿￿
t (30)
Household￿ s intratemporal e¢ ciency condition
~ ct =
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
K￿
t [(1 ￿ ￿)lt]
￿￿
De￿ning ￿0 =
￿
1￿￿￿, this can be expressed as:
￿0ct = (1 ￿ ￿)k￿
t h￿￿
t (31)
Law of motion of aggregate capital stock
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + ￿it [1 ￿ ￿(￿ !t)￿]
Dividing by ￿yields the scaled version:
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + it [1 ￿ ￿(￿ !t)￿] (32)
22Household￿ s intertemporal e¢ ciency condition
qt
1
~ ct
= ￿Et
￿
1
~ ct+1
h
qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿t+1￿K￿￿1
t+1 [(1 ￿ ￿)lt+1]
1￿￿
i￿
Dividing both sides by
1￿￿
￿ and scaling the inputs by ￿yields:
qt
1
ct
= ￿Et
￿
1
ct+1
￿
qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿t+1￿k￿￿1
t+1 h1￿￿
t+1
￿
￿
(33)
The conditions from the ￿nancial contract are already in scaled form:
Contract e¢ ciency condition
qt =
1
1 ￿ ￿(￿ !t)￿ + ￿(￿ !t)￿
f(￿ !t)
f0(￿ !t)
(34)
Contract incentive compatibility constraint
it
nt
=
1
1 ￿ qtg (￿ !t)
(35)
Where nt is entrepreneur￿ s net worth.
Determination of net worth
￿nt = Zt
h
qt (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿tK￿￿1
t [(1 ￿ ￿)lt]
1￿￿
i
23or, in scaled terms:
nt = zt
￿
qt (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿tk￿￿1
t h1￿￿
t
￿
(36)
Note that zt denotes (scaled) entrepreneur￿ s capital.
Law of motion of entrepreneur￿ s capital
Zt+1 = ￿nt
￿
f (￿ !t)
1 ￿ qtg (￿ !t)
￿
￿ ￿
ce
t
qt
Or, dividing by ￿
zt+1 = nt
￿
f (￿ !t)
1 ￿ qtg (￿ !t)
￿
￿
ce
t
qt
(37)
Entrepreneur￿ s intertemporal e¢ ciency condition
qt = ￿￿Et
￿h
qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿t+1￿K￿￿1
t+1 [(1 ￿ ￿)lt+1]
1￿￿
i￿
qt+1f (￿ !t+1)
1 ￿ qt+1g (￿ !t+1)
￿￿
Or, in scaled terms:
qt = ￿￿Et
￿￿
qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿t+1￿k￿￿1
t+1 h1￿￿
t+1
￿￿
qt+1f (￿ !t+1)
1 ￿ qt+1g (￿ !t+1)
￿￿
(38)
245.2 De￿nition of Steady-state
Steady-state is de￿ned by time-invariant quantities:
ct = ^ c;ce
t = ^ ce;kt = ^ k; ￿ !t = ^ !;ht = ^ h;qt = ^ q;zt = ^ z;nt = ^ n;it = ^ {
So there are nine unknowns. While we have nine equilibrium conditions, the two in-
tertemporal e¢ ciency conditions become identical in steady-state since C&F impose the
condition that the internal rate of return to entrepreneur is o⁄set by their additional dis-
count factor:
￿
￿
^ qf (^ !)
1 ￿ ^ qg (^ !)
￿
= 1 (39)
This results in an indeterminacy - but there is a block recursiveness of the model due to the
calibration exercise. In particular, we demonstrate that the risk premium and bankruptcy
rate determine (^ !;￿) - these in turn determine the steady-state price of capital. From
eq.(33)we have:
^ q =
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
^ k￿￿1^ h1￿￿ =
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
^ y
^ k
(40)
From eq.(31)we have:
^ h =
1 ￿ ￿
￿0
^ k￿^ h1￿￿
^ c
=
1 ￿ ￿
￿0
^ y
^ c
(41)
From eq.(32)we have:
^ k =
1 ￿ ￿(^ !)￿
￿
^ { (42)
Note that these three equations are normally (i.e. in a typical RBC framework) used to
25￿nd steady-state
￿
^ k;^ h;^ c
￿
- because ^ q = 1. Here since the price of capital is endogenous, we
have four unknowns. From eq. (36)and eq. (33)we have
^ n = ^ z
￿
^ q (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
^ y
^ k
￿
= ^ z
^ q
￿
(43)
From eq. (37)and the restriction on the entrepreneur￿ s additional discount factor (eq. (39)),
we have
^ z = ^ n
1
^ q￿
￿
^ ce
^ q
(44)
Combining eqs. (43)and (44) yields:
^ ce
^ n
=
1
￿
￿ ￿ (45)
We have the two conditions from the ￿nancial contract
^ q =
1
1 ￿ ￿(^ !)￿ + ￿(^ !)￿
f(^ !)
f0(^ !)
(46)
And
^ { =
1
1 ￿ ^ q (1 ￿ ￿(^ !)￿ ￿ f (^ !))
^ n (47)
Finally, we have the resource constraint:
^ c + ^ ce +^ { = ^ k￿^ h1￿￿ (48)
The eight equations (40);(41);(42);(43);(44);(46);(47);(48) are insu¢ cient to ￿nd the
26nine unknowns. However, the risk premium, denoted as ￿, is de￿ned by the following
^ q^ !
^ {
^ { ￿ ^ n
= ￿ (49)
But we also know (from eq.(47) that
^ n
^ {
= 1 ￿ ^ q (1 ￿ ￿(^ !)￿ ￿ f (^ !)) = 1 ￿ ^ qg (^ !)
Rearranging eq.(49) yields:
^ q^ !
￿
= 1 ￿
^ n
^ {
substituting from the previous expression yields
^ ! = ￿g (^ !) (50)
Let ￿ = bankruptcy rate ￿this observable also provides another condition on the distri-
bution. That is, we require:
￿(^ !) = ￿ (51)
The two equations eq.(50) and eq. (51) can be solved for the two unknowns - (^ !;￿).
By varying the bankruptcy rate and the risk premium, we can determine di⁄erent levels of
uncertainty (￿)and the cuto⁄ point (^ !).
Note that the price of capital in steady-state, is a function of (^ !;￿) as determined by
eq. (46). The other preference parameter, ￿ is then determined by eq. (39). Once
27this is determined, the remaining unknowns:
￿
^ c;^ ce;^ h;^ {;^ k; ^ z; ^ n
￿
are determined by eqs.
(40);(41);(42);(43);(45);(47);(48).
Finally, we note that the parameter ￿ does not play a role in the characteristics of
equilibrium and, in particular, the behavior of aggregate consumption. This can be seen by
￿rst de￿ning aggregate consumption:
(1 ￿ ￿)~ ct + ￿ce
t = CA
t
Dividing by ￿ and using the earlier de￿nitions:
ct + ce
t = cA
t (52)
Since the policy rules for household and entrepreneurial consumption are de￿ned as the
percentage deviations from steady-state, aggregate consumption will be similarly de￿ned
(and note that since cA
t = 1
￿CA
t ;percentage deviations of aggregate consumption and scaled
aggregate consumption are identical). Using an asterisk to denote percentage deviations
from steady-state, we have:
^ c
^ c + ^ cec￿
t +
^ ce
^ c + ^ cece￿
t = cA￿
t (53)
It is this equation that is used to analyze the cyclical properties of aggregate consumption.
286 Data Appendix
Data Source for Table 1:
￿ Bankruptcy rates for the E.U. nations: Klapper (2001) Table 2. For the U.S. bank-
ruptcy rate, see Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
￿ Risk Premium: Lending minus deposit rates. Source: European Central Bank. Na-
tional Retail Interest Rates. 1995:4 - 2002:8
1. ￿ Austria
￿Lending Rate; N4 Short-term loans to enterprises. ￿ Loans to enterprises￿ .
￿Deposit Rate; N8 Time deposits. ￿ Saving deposits with maturity up to 12
months￿ .
￿ Ireland
￿Lending Rate; N4 Short-term loans to enterprises. ￿ Overdrafts and term
loans up to 1 year - AA rate/lending to ￿rms￿ .
￿Deposit Rate; N92 Savings accounts. ￿ Clearing banks demand deposits IEP
25 000 to IEP 100 000 - enterprises￿ .
￿ Spain
￿Lending Rate; N4 Short-term loans to enterprises. ￿ Variable rate; monthly
reviewable￿ .
￿Deposit Rate; N8 Time deposits. ￿ Deposits with maturity over 1 up to 2
years￿ .
29￿ U.S. (Source: Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997))
￿Risk Premium: The average spread between the prime rate and the three-
month commercial paper rate for the period April 1971 to June 1996.
Data Source for ACFs
All the European GDP per capita series are from the Datastream from 1960 to 2000.
These are seasonally adjusted and are expressed in current U.S. dollars. The Datastream
source codes are as follows:
￿ Austria: OEGDPH; Ireland: IRGDPH; Spain: ESGDPH; EMU11: EMGDPCR
￿ U.S.: GDP per capita is calculated using quarterly data for GDP total, Population
over 16 and CPI from 1948:1 to 2002:1. Source: Federal Reserve Bank Data Bank.
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Figure 1: Autocorrelation Functions for the U.S. and Selected EMU Countries’ 
Output Growth 
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Figure 2: Response of Output to Productivity Shock 
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Figure 3: Response of Aggregate Consumption to Productivity Shock 
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Figure 4: Response of Investment to Productivity Shock 
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Figure 5: Response of Bankruptcy Rate to Productivity Shock 
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Figure 6: Response of Risk Premium to Productivity Shock  
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Figure 7: Response of Price of Capital to Productivity Shock  
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